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Abstract
This paper employs a Skellam process to represent real-time betting odds for English Premier
League (EPL) soccer games. Given a matrix of market odds on all possible score outcomes, we
estimate the expected scoring rates for each team. The expected scoring rates then define the
implied volatility of an EPL game. As events in the game evolve, we re-estimate the expected
scoring rates and our implied volatility measure to provide a dynamic representation of the
market’s expectation of the game outcome. Using a dataset of 1520 EPL games from 2012-2016,
we show how our model calibrates well to the game outcome. We illustrate our methodology on
real-time market odds data for a game between Everton and West Ham in the 2015-2016 season.
We show how the implied volatility for the outcome evolves as goals, red cards, and corner kicks
occur. Finally, we conclude with directions for future research.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The betting market for the EPL
Gambling on soccer is a global industry with revenues between $700 billion and $1 trillion a
year (see ”Football Betting - the Global Gambling Industry worth Billions.” BBC Sport). Betting on
the result of a soccer match is a rapidly growing market, and online real-time odds exists (Betfair,
Bet365, Ladbrokes). Market odds for all possible score outcomes (0− 0, 1− 0, 0− 1, 2− 0, ...) as well
as outright win, lose and draw are available in real time. In this paper, we employ a two-parameter
probability model based on a Skellam process and a non-linear objective function to extract the
expected scoring rates for each team from the odds matrix. The expected scoring rates then define
the implied volatility of the game.
A key feature of our analysis is to use the real-time odds to re-calibrate the expected scoring
rates instantaneously as events evolve in the game. This allows us to assess how market expecta-
tions change according to exogenous events such as corner kicks, goals, and red cards. A plot of the
implied volatility provides a diagnostic tool to show how the market reacts to event information.
In particular, we study the evolution of the odds implied final score prediction over the course of
the game. Our dynamic Skellam model fits the scoring data well in a calibration study of 1520 EPL
games from the 2012 - 2016 seasons.
The goal of our study is to show how a parsimonious two-parameter model can flexibly model
the evolution of the market odds matrix of final scores. We provide a non-linear objective function
to fit our Skellam model to instantaneous market odds matrix. We then define the implied volatility
of an EPL game and use this as a diagnostics to show how the market’s expectation changes over
the course of a game.
One advantage of viewing market odds through the lens of a probability model is the ability
to obtain more accurate estimates of winning probabilities. For example, a typical market ”vig”
(or liquidity premium for bookmakers to make a return) is 5− 8% in the win, lose, draw market.
Now there is also extra information in the final score odds about the win odds. Our approach
helps to extract that information. Another application of the Skellam process is to model final score
outcomes as a function of characteristics (see Karlis and Ntzoufras (2003, 2009).)
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The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. The next subsection provides connections with
existing research. Section 2 presents our Skellam process model for representing the difference
in goals scored. We then show how to make use of an odds matrix while calibrating the model
parameters. We calculate a dynamic implied prediction of any score and hence win, lose and draw
outcomes, using real-time online market odds. Section 3 illustrates our methodology using an EPL
game between Everton and West Ham during the 2015-2016 season. Finally, Section 4 discusses
extensions and concludes with directions for future research.
1.2 Connections with Existing Work
There is considerable interest in developing probability models for the evolution of the score
of sporting events. Stern (1994) and Polson and Stern (2015) propose a continuous time Brownian
motion model for the difference in scores in a sporting event and show how to calculate the im-
plied volatility of a game. We build on their approach by using a difference of Poisson processes
(a.k.a. Skellam process) for the discrete evolution of the scores of an EPL game, see also Karlis and
Ntzoufras (2003, 2009) and Koopman et al. (2014). Early probabilistic models (Lee 1997) predicted
the outcome of soccer matches using independent Poisson processes. Later models incorporate a
correlation between the two scores and model the number of goals scored by each team using bi-
variate Poisson models (see Maher (1982) and Dixon and Coles (1997)). Our approach follows Stern
(1994) by modeling the score difference (a.k.a. margin of victory), instead of modeling the number
of goals and the correlation between scores directly.
There is also an extensive literature on soccer gambling and market efficiency. For example,
Vecer et al. (2009) estimates the scoring intensity in a soccer game from betting markets. Dixon
and Pope (2004) presents a detailed comparison of odds set by different bookmakers. Fitt (2009)
uses market efficiency to analyze the mispricing of cross-sectional odds and Fitt et al. (2005) models
online soccer spread bets.
Another line of research, asks whether betting markets are efficient and, if not, how to exploit
potential inefficiencies in the betting market. For example, Levitt (2004) discusses the structural
difference of the gambling market and financial markets. The study examines whether bookmakers
are more skilled at game prediction than bettors and in turn exploit bettor biases by setting prices
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that deviate from the market clearing price. Avery and Chevalier (1999) examine the hypothesis that
sentimental bettors act like noise traders and can affect the path of prices in soccer betting markets.
2 Skellam Process for EPL scores
To model the outcome of a soccer game between team A and team B, we let the difference in
scores, N(t) = NA(t)− NB(t) where NA(t) and NB(t) are the team scores at time point t. Negative
values of N(t) indicate that team A is behind. We begin at N(0) = 0 and ends at time one with
N(1) representing the final score difference. The probability P(N(1) > 0) represents the ex-ante
odds of team A winning. Half-time score betting, which is common in Europe, is available for the
distribution of N( 12 ).
We develop a probabilistic model for the distribution of N(1) given N(t) = ` where ` is the
current lead. This model, together with the current market odds can be used to infer the expected
scoring rates of the two teams and then to define the implied volatility of the outcome of the match.
We let λA and λB denote the expected scoring rates for the whole game. We allow for the possibility
that the scoring abilities (and their market expectations) are time-varying, in which case we denote
the expected scoring rates after time t by λAt and λ
B
t respectively, instead of λ
A(1− t) and λB(1− t).
2.1 Implied Score Prediction from EPL Odds
The Skellam distribution is defined as the difference between two independent Poisson vari-
ables, see Skellam (1946), Sellers (2012), Alzaid et al. (2010), and Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard
(2012). Karlis and Ntzoufras (2009) shows how Skellam distribution can be extended to a differ-
ence of distributions which have a specific trivariate latent variable structure. Following Karlis and
Ntzoufras (2003), we decompose the scores of each team as

NA(t) = WA(t) +W(t)
NB(t) = WB(t) +W(t)
(1)
where WA(t), WB(t) and W(t) are independent processes with WA(t) ∼ Poisson(λAt), WB(t) ∼
Poisson(λBt). Here W(t) is a non-negative integer-valued process to induce a correlation between
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the numbers of goals scored. By modeling the score difference, N(t), we avoid having to specify the
distribution of W(t) as the difference in goals scored is independent of W(t). Specifically, we have
a Skellam distribution
N(t) = NA(t)− NB(t) = WA(t)−WB(t) ∼ Skellam(λAt,λBt). (2)
where λAt is the cumulative expected scoring rate on the interval [0, t]. At time t, we have the
conditional distributions 
WA(1)−WA(t) ∼ Poisson(λA(1− t))
WB(1)−WB(t) ∼ Poisson(λB(1− t))
(3)
Now letting N∗(1− t), the score difference of the sub-game which starts at time t and ends at time 1
and the duration is (1− t). By construction, N(1) = N(t) +N∗(1− t). Since N∗(1− t) and N(t) are
differences of two Poisson process on two disjoint time periods, by the property of Poisson process,
N∗(1− t) and N(t) are independent. Hence, we can re-express equation (2) in terms of N∗(1− t),
and deduce
N∗(1− t) = W∗A(1− t)−W∗B(1− t) ∼ Skellam(λAt ,λBt ) (4)
where W∗A(1− t) = WA(1)−WA(t), λA = λA0 and λAt = λA(1− t). A natural interpretation of the
expected scoring rates, λAt and λ
B
t , is that they reflect the ”net” scoring ability of each team from
time t to the end of the game. The term W(t) model a common strength due to external factors,
such as weather. The ”net” scoring abilities of the two teams are assumed to be independent of
each other as well as the common strength factor. We can calculate the probability of any particular
score difference, given by P(N(1) = x|λA,λB), at the end of the game where the λ’s are estimated
from the matrix of market odds. Team strength and ”net” scoring ability can be influenced by
various underlying factors, such as the offensive and defensive abilities of the two teams. The goal
of our analysis is to only represent these parameters at every instant as a function of the market
odds matrix for all scores.
To derive the implied winning probability, we use the law of total probability. The probability
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mass function of a Skellam random variable is the convolution of two Poisson distributions:
P(N(1) = x|λA,λB) =
∞
∑
k=0
P(WB(1) = k− x|WA(1) = k,λB)P(WA(1) = k|λA)
=
∞
∑
k=max{0,x}
{
e−λ
B (λB)k−x
(k− x)!
}{
e−λ
A (λA)k
k!
}
= e−(λ
A+λB)
∞
∑
k=max{0,x}
(λB)k−x(λA)k
(k− x)!k!
= e−(λ
A+λB)
(
λA
λB
)x/2
I|x|(2
√
λAλB) (5)
where Ir(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind (for full details, see Alzaid et al. (2010)),
thus has the series representation
Ir(x) =
( x
2
)r ∞
∑
k=0
(x2/4)k
k!Γ(r+ k+ 1)
.
The probability of home team A winning is given by
P(N(1) > 0|λA,λB) =
∞
∑
x=1
P(N(1) = x|λA,λB). (6)
In practice, we truncate the number of possible goals since the probability of an extreme score
difference is negligible. Unlike the Brownian motion model for the evolution of the outcome in a
sports game (Stern (1994), Polson and Stern (2015)), the probability of a draw in our setting is not
zero. Instead, P(N(1) = 0|λA,λB) > 0 depends on the sum and product of two parameters λA and
λB and thus the odds of a draw are non-zero.
For two evenly matched teams withλA = λB = λ, we have
P(N(1) = 0|λA = λB = λ) = e−2λ I0(2λ) =
∞
∑
k=0
1
(k!)2
(
λk
eλ
)2
. (7)
Figure 1 shows that this probability is a monotone decreasing function of λ and so two evenly
matched teams with large λ’s are less likely to achieve a draw.
Another quantity of interest is the conditional probability of winning as the game progresses.
If the current lead at time t is `, and N(t) = ` = NA(t) − NB(t), the Poisson property implied
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Figure 1: Left: Probability of a draw for two evenly matched teams. Right: Probability of score
differences for two evenly matched teams. Lambda values are denoted by different colors.
that the final score difference (N(1)|N(t) = `)can be calculated by using the fact that N(1) =
N(t) + N∗(1− t) and N(t) and N∗(1− t) are independent. Specifically, conditioning on N(t) = `,
we have the identity
N(1) = N(t) + N∗(1− t) = `+ Skellam(λAt ,λBt ).
We are now in a position to find the conditional distribution (N(1) = x|N(t) = `) for every
time point t of the game given the current score. Simply put, we have the time homogeneous
condition
P(N(1) = x|λAt ,λBt , N(t) = `) = P(N(1)− N(t) = x− `|λAt ,λBt , N(t) = `)
= P(N∗(1− t) = x− `|λAt ,λBt ) (8)
where λAt , λ
B
t , ` are given by market expectations at time t.
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Two conditional probabilities of interest are he chances that the home team A wins,
P(N(1) > 0|λAt ,λBt , N(t) = `) = P(`+ N∗(1− t) > 0|λAt ,λBt )
= P(Skellam(λAt ,λ
B
t ) > −`|λAt ,λBt )
= ∑
x>−`
e−(λ
A
t +λ
B
t )
(
λAt
λBt
)x/2
I|x|(2
√
λAt λ
B
t ). (9)
and the conditional probability of a draw at time t is
P(N(1) = 0|λAt ,λBt , N(t) = `) = P(`+ N∗(1− t) = 0|λAt ,λBt )
= P(Skellam(λAt ,λ
B
t ) = −`|λAt ,λBt )
= e−(λ
A
t +λ
B
t )
(
λAt
λBt
)−`/2
I|`|(2
√
λAt λ
B
t ). (10)
The conditional probability at time t of home team A losing is 1−P(N(1) > 0|λAt ,λBt , N(t) = `).
We now turn to the calibration of our model from given market odds.
2.2 Market Calibration
Our information set at time t, denoted by It, includes the current lead N(t) = ` and the market
odds for {Win, Lose, Draw, Score}t, where Scoret = {(i − j) : i, j = 0, 1, 2, ....}. These market odds
can be used to calibrate a Skellam distribution which has only two parameters λAt and λ
B
t . The best
fitting Skellam model with parameters {λˆAt , λˆBt } will then provide a better estimate of the market’s
information concerning the outcome of the game than any individual market (such as win odds) as
they are subject to a ”vig” and liquidity. Suppose that the fractional odds for all possible final score
outcomes are given by a bookmaker. In this case, the bookmaker pays out three times the amount
staked by the bettor if the outcome is indeed 2-1. Fractional odds are used in the UK, while money-
line odds are favored by American bookmakers with 2 : 1 (”two-to-one”) implying that the bettor
stands to make a $200 profit on a $100 stake. The market implied probability makes the expected
winning amount of a bet equal to 0. In this case, the implied probability p = 1/(1 + 3) = 1/4
and the expected winning amount is µ = −1 ∗ (1− 1/4) + 3 ∗ (1/4) = 0. We denote this odds as
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odds(2, 1) = 3. To convert all the available odds to implied probabilities, we use the identity
P(NA(1) = i, NB(1) = j) =
1
1+ odds(i, j)
.
The market odds matrix, O, with elements oij = odds(i − 1, j− 1), i, j = 1, 2, 3... provides all pos-
sible combinations of final scores. Odds on extreme outcomes are not offered by the bookmakers.
Since the probabilities are tiny, we set them equal to 0. The sum of the possible probabilities is
still larger than 1 (see Dixon and Coles (1997) and Polson and Stern (2015)). This ”excess” prob-
ability corresponds to a quantity known as the ”market vig.” For example, if the sum of all the
implied probabilities is 1.1, then the expected profit of the bookmaker is 10%. To account for this
phenomenon, we scale the probabilities to sum to 1 before estimation.
To estimate the expected scoring rates, λAt and λ
B
t , for the sub-game N
∗(1− t), the odds from
a bookmaker should be adjusted by NA(t) and NB(t). For example, if NA(0.5) = 1, NB(0.5) = 0
and odds(2, 1) = 3 at half time, these observations actually says that the odds for the second half
score being 1-1 is 3 (the outcomes for the whole game and the first half are 2-1 and 1-0 respectively,
thus the outcome for the second half is 1-1). The adjusted odds∗ for N∗(1− t) is calculated using the
original odds as well as the current scores and given by
odds∗(x, y) = odds(x+ NA(t), y+ NB(t)). (11)
At time t (0 ≤ t ≤ 1), we calculate the implied conditional probabilities of score differences
using odds information
P(N(1) = k|N(t) = `) = P(N∗(1− t) = k− `) = 1
c ∑i−j=k−`
1
1+ odds∗(i, j)
(12)
where c = ∑i,j
1
1+odds∗(i,j) is a scale factor, ` = NA(t)− NB(t), i, j ≥ 0 and k = 0,±1,±2 . . ..
Moments of the Poisson distribution make it straightforward to derive the moments of a Skel-
lam random variable with parameters λA and λB. The unconditional mean and variance are given
by
E[N(1)] = E[WA(1)]− E[WB(1)] = λA − λB,
9
V[N(1)] = V[WA(1)] +V[WB(1)] = λA + λB.
Therefore, the conditional moments are given by

E[N(1)|N(t) = `] = `+ (λAt − λBt ),
V[N(1)|N(t) = `] = λAt + λBt .
(13)
We also need to ensure that Eˆ[N(1)|N(t) = `] − ` ≤ Vˆ[N(1)|N(t) = `]. A method of moments
estimate of λ’s is given by the solution to

Eˆ[N(1)|N(t) = `] = `+ (λAt − λBt ),
Vˆ[N(1)|N(t) = `] = λAt + λBt ,
(14)
where Eˆ and Vˆ are the expectation and variance calculated using market implied conditional prob-
abilities, could be negative. To address this issue, we define the residuals

DE = Eˆ[N(1)|N(t) = `]− [`+ (λAt − λBt )],
DV = Vˆ[N(1)|N(t) = `]− (λAt + λBt ).
(15)
We then calibrate parameters by adding the constraints λAt ≥ 0 and λBt ≥ 0 and solving the follow-
ing equivalent constrained optimization problem.
(
λˆAt , λˆ
B
t
)
= arg min
λAt ,λ
B
t
{
D2E + D
2
V
}
(16)
subject to λAt ≥ 0,λBt ≥ 0
Figure 2 illustrates a simulation evolution of an EPL game between Everton and West Ham
(March 5th, 2016) with their estimated parameters. It provides a discretized version of Figure 1 in
Polson and Stern (2015). The outcome probability of first half and updated second half are given
in the left two panels. The top right panel illustrates a simulation-based approach to visualizing
how the model works in the dynamic evolution of score difference. In the bottom left panel, from
half-time onwards, we also simulate a set of possible Monte Carlo paths to the end of the game.
This illustrates the discrete nature of our Skellam process and how the scores evolve.
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Figure 2: The Skellam process model for winning margin and game simulations. The top left
panel shows the outcome distribution using odds data before the match starts. Each bar repre-
sents the probability of a distinct final score difference, with its color corresponding to the result
of win/lose/draw. Score differences larger than 5 or smaller than -5 are not shown. The top right
panel shows a set of simulated Skellam process paths for the game outcome. The bottom row has
the two figures updated using odds data available at half-time.
2.3 Model Diagnostics
To assess the performance our score-difference Skellam model calibration for the market odds,
we have collected data from ladbrokes.com on the correct score odds of 18 EPL games (from Octo-
ber 15th to October 22nd, 2016) and plot the calibration result in Figure 3. The Q-Q plot of log(odds)
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is also shown. In average, there are 13 different outcomes per game, i.e., N(1) = −6,−5, ...0, ..., 5, 6.
In total 238 different outcomes are used. We compare our Skellam implied probabilities with the
market implied probabilities for every outcome of the 18 games. If the model calibration is suf-
ficient, all the data points should lies on the diagonal line. Figure 3 left panel demonstrates that
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Figure 3: Left: Market implied probabilities for the score differences versus Skellam implied proba-
bilities. Every data point represents a particular score difference; Right: Market log(odds) quantiles
versus Skellam implied log(odds) quantiles. Market odds (from ladbrokes.com) of 18 games in
EPL 2016-2017 are used (in average 13 score differences per game). The total number of outcomes
is 238.
our Skellam model is calibrated by the market odds sufficiently well, except for the underestimated
draw probabilities. Karlis and Ntzoufras (2009) describe this underestimation phenomenon in a
Poisson-based model for the number of goals scored. Following their approach, we apply a zero-
inflated version of Skellam distribution to improve the fit on draw probabilities, namely

P˜(N(1) = 0) = p+ (1− p)P(N(1) = 0)
P˜(N(1) = x) = (1− p)P(N(1) = x) if x 6= 0.
(17)
Here 0 < p < 1 is an inflation factor and P˜ denotes the inflated probabilities. We also consider
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another type of inflation here

P˜(N(1) = 0) = (1+ θ)P(N(1) = 0)
P˜(N(1) = x) = (1− γ)P(N(1) = x) if x 6= 0
(18)
where θ is the inflation factor and P(N(1) = 0) = γ/(γ+ θ).
Both types of inflation factors have the corresponding interpretation regarding the bookmak-
ers’ way of setting odds. With the first type of factor, the bookmakers generate two different set of
probabilities, one specifically for the draw probability (namely the inflation factor p) and the other
for all the outcomes using the Skellam model. The “market vig” for all the outcomes is a constant.
With the second type, the bookmakers use the Skellam model to generate the probabilities for all the
outcomes. Then they apply a larger “market vig” for draws than others. Yates (1982) also point out
the “collapsing” tendency in forecasting behavior, whereby the bookmakers are inclined to report
forecasts of 50% when they feel they know little about the event. In Figure 3 right panel, we see that
the Skellam implied log(odds) has a heavier right tail than the market implied log(odds). This effect
results from the overestimation of extreme outcomes, which in turn is due to market microstructure
effect due to the market “vig”.
To assess the out-of-sample predictive ability of the Skellam model, we analyze the market
(win, lose, draw) odds for 1520 EPL games (from 2012 to 2016, 380 games per season). However,
the sample covariance of the end of game scores,NA(1) and NB(1), is close to 0. If we assume
parameters stay the same, then the estimates are λˆA = 1.5 and λˆB = 1.2. Since the probabilities
of win, lose and draw sum to 1, we only plot the market implied probabilities of win and draw.
In Figure 4 left panel, the draw probability is nearly a non-linear function of the win probability.
To illustrate our model, we set the value of λAλB = 1.5× 1.2 = 1.8 and plot the curve of Skellam
implied probabilities (red line). We further provide the inflated Skellam probabilities (blue line for
the first type and green line for the second type). As expected, the non-inflated Skellam model (red
line) underestimates the draw probabilities while the second type inflated Skellam model (green
line) produces the better fit. We also group games by the market implied winning probability of
home teams P(N(1) > 0): (0.05,0.1], (0.1,0.15], · · · , (0.8,0.85]. We calculate the frequency of home
team winning for each group. In Figure 4 right panel, the barplot of frequencies (x-axis is regarding
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Figure 4: Left: Market implied probabilities of win and draw. The fitted curves are Skellam implied
probabilities with fixed λAλB = 1.8. Right: Market odds and result frequency of home team win-
ning. 1520 EPL games from 2012 to 2016 are used. The dashed line represents: Frequency = Market
Implied Probability
scaled odds) shows that the market is efficient, i.e., the frequency is close to the corresponding
market implied probability and our Skellam model is calibrated to the market outcome for this
dataset.
2.4 Time-Varying Extension
One extension that is clearly warranted is allowing for time-varying {λAt ,λBt } where the Skel-
lam model is re-calibrated dynamically through updated market odds during the game. We use the
current {λAt ,λBt } to project possible results of the match in our Skellam model. Here {λAt ,λBt } re-
veal the market expectation of scoring difference for both teams from time t to the end of the game
as the game progresses. Similar to the martingale approach of Polson and Stern (2015), {λAt ,λBt }
reveal the best prediction of the game result. From another point of view, this approach is the same
as assuming homogeneous rates for the rest of the game.
An alternative approach to time-varying {λAt ,λBt } is to use a Skellam regression with condi-
tioning information such as possession percentages, shots (on goal), corner kicks, yellow cards, red
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cards, etc. We would expect jumps in the {λAt ,λBt } during the game when some important events
happen. A typical structure takes the form

log(λAt ) = αA + βAXA,t−1
log(λBt ) = αB + βBXB,t−1,
(19)
estimated using standard log-linear regression.
Our approach relies on the betting market being efficient so that the updating odds should
contain all information of game statistics. Using log differences as the dependent variable is another
alternative with a state space evolution. Koopman et al. (2014) adopt stochastically time-varying
densities in modeling the Skellam process. Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2012) is another example of the
Skellam process with different integer valued extensions in the context of high-frequency financial
data. Further analysis is required, and this produces a promising area for future research.
3 Example: Everton vs West Ham (3/5/2016)
We collect the real-time online betting odds data from ladbrokes.com for an EPL game be-
tween Everton and West Ham on March 5th, 2016. By collecting real-time online betting data for
every 10-minute interval, we can show the evolution of betting market prediction on the final re-
sult. We do not account for the overtime for both 1st half and 2nd half of the match and focus on a
90-minute game.
3.1 Implied Skellam Probabilities
Table 1 shows the raw data of odds right the game. We need to transform odds data into
probabilities. For example, for the outcome 0-0, 11/1 is equivalent to a probability of 1/12. Then
we can calculate the marginal probability of every score difference from -4 to 5. We neglect those
extreme scores with small probabilities and rescale the sum of event probabilities to one.
In Figure 5, the probabilities estimated by the model are compared with the market implied
probabilities. As we see, during the course of the game, the Skellam assumption suffices to approx-
imate market expectation of score difference distribution. This set of plots is evidence of goodness-
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Everton \West Ham 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 11/1 12/1 28/1 66/1 200/1 450/1
1 13/2 6/1 14/1 40/1 100/1 350/1
2 7/1 7/1 14/1 40/1 125/1 225/1
3 11/1 11/1 20/1 50/1 125/1 275/1
4 22/1 22/1 40/1 100/1 250/1 500/1
5 50/0 50/1 90/1 150/1 400/1
6 100/1 100/1 200/1 250/1
7 250/1 275/1 375/1
8 325/1 475/1
Table 1: Original odds data from Ladbrokes before the game started
t = 0 t = 0.11 t = 0.22
t = 0.33 t = 0.44 t = 0.61
t = 0.72 t = 0.83 t = 0.94
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Figure 5: Market implied probabilities versus the probabilities estimated by the model at different
time points, using the parameters given in Table 3 .
of-fit the Skellam model.
Table 2 shows the model implied probability for the outcome of score differences before the
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Score difference -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Market Prob. (%) 1.70 2.03 4.88 12.33 21.93 22.06 16.58 9.82 4.72 2.23
Skellam Prob.(%) 0.78 2.50 6.47 13.02 19.50 21.08 16.96 10.61 5.37 2.27
Table 2: Market implied probabilities for the score differences versus Skellam implied probabilities
at different time points. The estimated parameters λˆA = 2.33, λˆB = 1.44.
game, compared with the market implied probability. As we see, the Skellam model appears to
have longer tails. Different from independent Poisson modeling in Dixon and Coles (1997), our
model is more flexible with the correlation between two teams. However, the trade-off of flexibility
is that we only know the probability of score difference instead of the exact scores.
Figure 6: The betting market data for Everton and West Ham is from ladbrokes.com. Market
implied probabilities (expressed as percentages) for three different results (Everton wins, West Ham
wins and draw) are marked by three distinct colors, which vary dynamically as the game proceeds.
The solid black line shows the evolution of the implied volatility (defined in Section 3.2). The
dashed line shows significant events in the game, such as goals and red cards. Five goals in this
game are 13’ Everton, 56’ Everton, 78’ West Ham, 81’ West Ham and 90’ West Ham.
Finally, we can plot these probability paths in Figure 6 to examine the behavior of the two
teams and represent the market predictions on the final result. Notably, we see the probability
change of win/draw/loss for important events during the game: goals scoring and a red card
penalty. In such a dramatic game, the winning probability of Everton gets raised to 90% before the
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first goal of West Ham in 78th minutes. The first two goals scored by West Ham in the space of 3
minutes completely reverses the probability of winning. The probability of draw gets raised to 90%
until we see the last-gasp goal of West Ham that decides the game.
3.2 How the Market Forecast Adapts
A natural question arises to how does the market odds (win, lose, draw and actual score) adjust
as the game evolves. This is similar to option pricing where Black-Scholes model uses its implied
volatility to show how market participants’ beliefs change. Our Skellam model mimics its way and
shows how the market forecast adapts to changing situations during the game. See Merton (1976)
for references of jump models.
Our work builds on Polson and Stern (2015) who define the implied volatility of a NFL game.
For an EPL game, we simply define the implied volatility as σIV,t =
√
λAt + λ
B
t . As the market
provides real-time information about λAt and λ
B
t , we can dynamically estimate σIV,t as the game
proceeds. Any goal scored is a discrete Poisson shock to the expected score difference (Skellam
process) between the teams, and our odds implied volatility measure will be updated.
Figure 6 plots the path of implied volatility throughout the course of the game. Instead of a
downward sloping line, we see changes in the implied volatility as critical moments occur in the
game. The implied volatility path provides a visualization of the conditional variation of the market
prediction for the score difference. For example, when Everton lost a player by a red card penalty
at 34th minute, our estimates λˆAt and λˆ
B
t change accordingly. There is a jump in implied volatility
and our model captures the market expectation adjustment about the game prediction. The change
in λˆA and λˆB are consistent with the findings of Vecer et al. (2009) where the scoring intensity of the
penalized team drops while the scoring intensity of the opposing team increases. When a goal is
scored in the 13th minute, we see the increase of λˆBt and the market expects that the underdog team
is pressing to come back into the game, an effect that has been well-documented in the literature.
Another important effect that we observe at the end of the game is that as goals are scored (in the
78th and 81st minutes), the markets expectation is that the implied volatility increases again as one
might expect.
Figure 7 compares the updating implied volatility of the game with implied volatilities of fixed
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Figure 7: Red line: the path of implied volatility throughout the game, i.e., σredt =
√
λˆAt + λˆ
B
t . Blue
lines: the path of implied volatility with constant λA + λB, i.e., σbluet =
√
(λA + λB) ∗ (1− t). Here
(λA + λB) = 1, 2, ..., 8.
t 0 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.50 0.61 0.72 0.83 0.94 1
λˆAt /(1− t) 2.33 2.51 2.53 2.46 1.89 1.85 2.12 2.12 2.61 4.61 0
λˆBt /(1− t) 1.44 1.47 1.59 1.85 2.17 2.17 2.56 2.90 3.67 5.92 0
(λˆAt + λˆ
B
t )/(1− t) 3.78 3.98 4.12 4.31 4.06 4.02 4.68 5.03 6.28 10.52 0
σIV,t 1.94 1.88 1.79 1.70 1.50 1.42 1.35 1.18 1.02 0.76 0
Table 3: The calibrated {λˆAt , λˆBt } divided by (1 − t) and the implied volatility during the game.
{λAt ,λBt } are expected goals scored for rest of the game. The less the remaining time, the less likely
to score goals. Thus {λˆAt , λˆBt } decrease as t increases to 1. Diving them by (1 − t) produces an
updated version of λˆ0’s for the whole game, which are in general time-varying (but not decreasing
necessarily).
(λA + λB). At the beginning of the game, the red line (updating implied volatility) is under the
”(λA + λB = 4)”-blue line; while at the end of the game, it’s above the ”(λA + λB = 8)”-blue line.
As we expect, the value of (λˆAt + λˆ
B
t )/(1− t) in Table 3 increases throughout the game, implying
that the game became more and more intense and the market continuously updates its belief in the
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odds.
4 Discussion
The goal of our analysis is to provide a probabilistic methodology for calibrating real-time
market odds for the evolution of the score difference for a soccer game.Rather than directly using
game information, we use the current odds market to calibrate a Skellam model to provide a forecast
of the final result. To our knowledge, our study is the first to offer an interpretation of the betting
market and to show how it reveals the market expectation of the game result through an implied
volatility. One area of future research is studying the index betting. For example, a soccer game
includes total goals scored in match and margin of superiority (see Jackson (1994)). The latter is the
score difference in our model, and so the Skellam process directly applies.
Our Skellam model is also valid for low-scoring sports such as baseball, hockey or American
football with a discrete series of scoring events. For NFL score prediction, Baker and McHale (2013)
propose a point process model that performs as well as the betting market. On the one hand,
our model has the advantage of implicitly considering the correlation between goals scored by
both teams but on the other hand, ignores the sum of goals scored. For high-scoring sports, such
as basketball, the Brownian motion adopted by Stern (1994) is more applicable. Rosenfeld (2012)
provides an extension of the model that addresses concerns of non-normality and uses a logistic
distribution to estimate the relative contribution of the lead and the remaining advantage. Another
avenue for future research, is to extend the Skellam model to allow for the dependent jumpiness of
scores which is somewhere in between these two extremes (see Glickman and Stern (1998), Polson
and Stern (2015) and Rosenfeld (2012) for further examples.)
Our model allows the researcher to test the inefficiency of EPL sports betting from a statistical
arbitrage viewpoint. More importantly, we provide a probabilistic approach for calibrating dynamic
market-based information. Camerer (1989) shows that the market odds are not well-calibrated and
that an ultimate underdog during a long losing streak is underpriced on the market. Golec and
Tamarkin (1991) test the NFL and college betting markets and find bets on underdogs or home
teams win more often than bets on favorites or visiting teams. Gray and Gray (1997) examine the
in-sample and out-of-sample performance of different NFL betting strategies by the probit model.
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They find the strategy of betting on home team underdogs averages returns of over 4 percent, over
commissions. In summary, a Skellam process appears to fit the dynamics of EPL soccer betting very
well and produces a natural lens to view these market efficiency questions.
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